A Russian expert explains how Moscow and Beijing can help solve the unresolvable war between Israel and Hamas 

On Tuesday evening, Israel conducted a "precision strike" against the "senior leadership of Hamas" in Doha, Qatar. Along with the US and Egypt, Qatar has led several attempts to end the Israel-Hamas war, while also serving as Hamas' headquarters outside of Gaza for years. Despite Qatar being regarded as an important US ally and hosting the huge Al Udeid airbase used by the US Air Force, West Jerusalem still claimed the strike to be an action against terrorists and nobody else. 

How will this strike affect the Gulf states, and is there a way to resolve the crisis with no more bloodshed? Russian expert, Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies at Russia's State Academic University for the Humanities Grigory Lukyanov explains how Moscow and Beijing can try to resolve the crisis as soon as this October. 

Qatar's vulnerability

RT: Why did Israel decide to strike Qatar, which was, so to speak, under protection, given its mediating position in negotiations between West Jerusalem and Hamas?

Grigory Lukyanov: Several events can be highlighted. The most important happened not so long ago, in early summer, with the short-lived Israeli-Iranian war, which ended, it should be recalled, with Iran striking American facilities on Qatari territory.

At that time, it was said that this had allowed Iran to save face, to demonstrate that a retaliatory strike had been carried out, and thus all sides exited the deadlocked crisis into which Israel's actions had primarily driven them.

But the side effect of such a decision was the literal removal of immunity from Qatar - an immunity it valued, which the emirate had been building around itself for many decades through active foreign policy, by positioning itself as a neutral state, a mediator in negotiations, oriented toward rejecting the use of force in military relations. All this was meant to create, in the eyes of the regional and global public, an image of Qatar as a country not seeking to use violence, but determined to defend itself, including with the support of allies - such as the US since Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, or Trkiye since the Qatar crisis of 2017.

But in fact, it was a strike on its territory, and no clear response was voiced against Iran. On the contrary, the Qatari leadership smoothed the situation over, thus demonstrating the possibility of striking Qatar's territory without any retaliation or consequences.

In the long term, this poses a serious threat not only to Qatar's security - and to its future overall - but also to the security of all Gulf Arab states, which, taking either neutral or friendly positions toward Israel, expected that the Arab-Israeli conflict would never affect them.

Now, with a strike that essentially violated the country's sovereignty, Qatar's leadership is again trying to present the situation not as an attack on Qatar itself, but as an attack on the Hamas mission in Qatar. But this doesn't sound very convincing.

Netanyahu's calculations

RT: Why else did it happen?

Grigory Lukyanov: Many of Israel's recent foreign policy actions have not only a foreign-policy or security dimension, but also a domestic one. In Israel, a political crisis has flared up connected to accusations that Benjamin Netanyahu's administration accepted bribes from Qatar since the October 2023 crisis. The bribes were allegedly taken to whitewash Qatar's image in the eyes of Israeli society.

Public opinion in Israel about Qatar has always been very mixed, especially because of the Al Jazeera channel, which rose to prominence by covering events in Lebanon and Palestine in an anti-Israeli light. Until recently, Al Jazeera continued operating in Palestine and Israel, and was only recently shut down.

In this context, for Netanyahu it was important to demonstrate that he had no special relationship with Qatar and that accusations of bias that might allegedly threaten Israel's security had no grounds.

This strike is in many ways aimed at criticizing Netanyahu's political opponents and allies. The strike on Doha demonstrates that Qatar harbored Hamas, which Netanyahu had promised to destroy - and he will keep his promise.

If Qatar had not allowed its territory to be used for the last strike during the 12-day war, Netanyahu would not have had such grounds to solve his domestic political dilemma in such an extravagant way.

RT: Sources from Channel 12 say that it was not Mossad but Israel's military intelligence that coordinated this. Can this be considered a rift inside the Israeli services?

Grigory Lukyanov: This may be connected to the fact that former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen has essentially declared his ambitions to become the next prime minister. He is dangerous as a political rival, since his authority inside Mossad is very strong.

At the same time, Netanyahu seeks to shift the blame for the 2023 failure (the Hamas incursion on Israeli territory in 2023 - RT) to Israel's security services. He cannot fully rely on all leaders or all structures within Israel's military command.

This is evidenced by the earlier crisis in relations with former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which led to a series of public conflicts and Gallant's dismissal. 

So it cannot be ruled out that in the current conditions, in carrying out such an operation, Netanyahu was also guided by internal bureaucratic considerations. He chooses those he can trust.

On the other hand, it is important to understand that despite the internal coordination of Israel's armed forces, they are not really divided by branches of the military and services. The IDF, Mossad, Shabak are deeply integrated with each other. In this context, it is also possible that it was simply easier to react this way. Perhaps there was no internal conflict at all - just a need to use the situation while it was still relevant.

Washington, Trump, and the bigger game

RT: It is claimed that US President Donald Trump gave Israel permission to strike Doha. How strong is Washington's role in the conflict?

Grigory Lukyanov: It's actually Netanyahu's clear understanding of the psychological profile of the current US president: he needs flattery, constant statements of his importance in world and regional politics. And the Israeli political establishment has long adopted this approach.

So regardless of whether there really was coordination at the level of intelligence agencies, the operation would have already succeeded or failed; it was worth claiming coordination with Trump simply to highlight his importance.

If the operation had succeeded - and we do not yet know, although there are statements that no one was injured or killed - it would have been a powerful blow against Hamas structures, whether political or military. Since both the US and Israel equally designate Hamas as a terrorist organization,  success could have allowed Trump to claim another victory in the fight against international terrorism, both for domestic and global audiences.

In case of failure, such claims would have shifted part of the responsibility away from Israel and tried to force the US to justify and cover both itself and Israel. To convince the world community that Washington knew nothing and had not agreed to anything would be just as damaging as a failed operation - hurting the US' reputation. That would mean Israel was acting on its own, like the tail wagging the dog.

We are dealing with subtle attempts by Israel to manipulate the character traits of the current US president, at a time when personality plays the highest role in American politics.

RT: How did it turn out that for some - such as the US and Israel - Hamas is considered terrorists, while for others it is the legitimate authority of Gaza, against whom such a military campaign cannot be waged?

Grigory Lukyanov: The US and Israel act fully consistently with their stated goals. Their aim is not just to deny Hamas' political subjectivity in words, but to deprive it in practice - politically, militarily, and in every other way. Strikes of this kind are carried out only against marginal actors, not recognized as legitimate political opponents.

The strike on Qatari soil shows that neither Israel nor the US - if the latter was involved - is interested in conducting any negotiations with Hamas. Qatar's mediation has been symbolically ended. Negotiations with Hamas are no longer needed and will not be conducted - in any form.

Thus, solving the Palestinian issue, the problem of Gaza, is seen exclusively in a non-negotiated way. Israel does not intend to negotiate with Hamas and, by its actions on Qatari territory, emphasizes that it needs no mediators.

But this raises another question - a humanitarian one, important for the entire Arab world: the fate of Gaza's civilian population. In practice, there is no one else to negotiate with but Hamas. Yet the US is trying to impose on Arab states the idea that responsibility for Gaza's population should fall either on the Arab states themselves or on Israel.

Regional fallout

RT: What are the real risks of such a policy by West Jerusalem?

Grigory Lukyanov: The serious political risk for Israel is the fate of the hostages. This is the reverse side of the humanitarian dimension.

Netanyahu has already repeatedly demonstrated that he is prepared to sacrifice the few remaining hostages - despite Israeli society's conviction that every Israeli life is valuable. His actions suggest that even these sacrifices may be acceptable, because what is at stake is much higher: ensuring reliable security.

And that security will not exist until Hamas is destroyed. This, I think, is a serious blow to the illusions of Arab states that Israel intends to negotiate with the weak. It is also a serious factor that will affect Egyptian politics, since Cairo, along with Qatar, acted as mediator between Israel and Hamas.

By these actions, Israel has further strengthened the threat to itself in a country like Egypt, which also mediated negotiations with Hamas. At the same time, there is a high chance that such a policy will bring Israel success.

RT: Can Arab states defend themselves?

Grigory Lukyanov: They show no ability to defend their own approaches to the problem. The Arab League cannot uphold its principles because of internal division, weakness, and lack of mutual understanding.

Still, they have a chance to agree and find another way to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli problem. For example, at the Russia-Arab World forum to be held this October. Russia still retains its status as a permanent Security Council member and is capable of being a mediator in such conflicts - something no Arab state can claim. The efforts of Russia, China, and BRICS could help Arab states protect their interests both in their own region and globally.

RT: Will the international community - particularly the UN and European states - react cautiously to this? Why are some actions harshly condemned while others are overlooked?

Grigory Lukyanov: The difficulty is that such actions have always been typical of Israel... This is the signature of Israeli security policy - physically eliminating opponents - which has simply become more visible recently. It needs no additional political statements, but it drags the region into a whirlpool of uncertainty that few can predict.

Israel is destroying rules of the game established not 10, 20, or even 50 years ago. These were rules that emerged after World War I, when principles were laid on the table of international negotiations against secret deals, principles that later underpinned first the League of Nations, and then the UN.

These principles say that politics must be public and accept certain values, including international ones. But Israel - and the US too, which killed Qassem Soleimani in 2019 - places above all the protection of national interests at any cost, including the physical elimination of political opponents.

Qatar, which until recently had always avoided conflicts and wars, has become the target of strikes twice in just one year. And the fact that these are precision strikes not aimed at the country's civilian population changes nothing. Qatar and Israel are not weak states at war, without unified governments recognized by the international community. Qatar is peaceful, prosperous, involved in the global economy, with huge revenues. And yet it is now the target of such strikes.

Qatar's word in regional and global politics may also weaken. By hosting groups like Hamas and acting as a mediator, Qatar was supposed to serve as a guarantor of agreements. But if it cannot guarantee even security, who will trust Qatar's word in the future?

Short-term security interests have been prioritized at the expense of the country's long-term reputation, sacrificing decades of work to secure itself by non-military means.

This may contribute to more instability, growing tensions, and militarization. For Qatar this is a serious wake-up call, which could lead to a rethinking of its approach to security. Or it could be ignored if Qatar's leadership still believes that, with low political participation by the population, it can offer its territory as a platform for others to solve their problems.

But this may cost it dearly in the long term, especially given Qatar's complicated relations with neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

RT: At the same time, many experts say it is the US that is losing credibility as a negotiating party, despite Trump's Middle East tour.

Grigory Lukyanov: The US is sought after in the region not for its reliability in negotiations, but for its immense military, economic, and political power. Countries must negotiate with the US and befriend it not because they want to, but because they have no alternative. No other power is as deeply involved in the region.

So this will not affect the reputation of the United States, since there have been many similar cases in the past. But for regional actors it matters. For Qatar and the Gulf states as a whole, it is significant.

Today, when Saudi Arabia and Turkey declare the unacceptability of such actions, this indicates that Israel no longer feels constrained by anything. Although Qatar was not a signatory to the Abraham Accords, it never attacked Israel. On the contrary, it helped: it took part in repelling Iran's missile strikes on Israel in 2024.

This should make regional actors reflect on where their passive position may lead. They cannot hide behind economic successes or ties with the US.

No alternative to Hamas

RT: And have regional actors truly accepted that there is no alternative to Hamas in the region?

Grigory Lukyanov: Who could have created such an alternative? Only Hamas itself. But in Gaza, Hamas did not allow any alternative to arise. It was comfortable for them to cooperate with Islamic Jihad, which is not a mass political organization and does not claim governing functions. That's all.

As for the Palestinian National Authority, it has neither moral, nor political, nor financial, nor human, nor organizational resources to counter Hamas. Moreover, Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections only underscored its successes.

Israel could have worked on creating some peaceful alternative to Hamas' armed forces, but it did not. The fact that Hamas is essentially illegitimate allows Israel to use the most inhumane measures not only against militants, but against all residents of Gaza.

For Arab states, the Palestinian issue has always receded to the background in the face of internal problems, such as the Arab Spring. On the contrary, it was in Egypt's and Qatar's interest for Hamas to control Gaza. No one was interested in an alternative.

And there still isn't one.